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The Business Cycle,
Investment, and a Wayward M2:
A Midyear Review
by Michael F. Bryan and John J. Erceg
M. ollowing a string of small advances
that began early last year, the pace of
economic expansion, as measured by
gross domestic product (GDP), picked
up in the first quarter. Led by a huge
$43.1 billion increase in consumer
spending, the annualized 2.4 percent
GDP growth in 1992:IQ was the
strongest rise in overall economic ac-
tivity in three years and came despite
another large liquidation of business in-
ventories (down $17.6 billion).
The economy's strength early in the year
surprised most observers, including the
members of the Fourth District Econo-
mists' Roundtable, whose consensus
forecast of last January 24 had projected
only a slight 0.5 percent gain in business
activity during the first quarter. In fact,
one-third of the 24 Roundtable fore-
casts offered at the January meeting
projected no growth or even a small
decline in the first three months of the
year. And of the four Roundtable pan-
elists expecting growth to exceed 1
percent in 1992:IIQ, none projected an
advance higher than 2 percent.
Against this background, the midyear
meeting of the Fourth District Econo-
mists' Roundtable was held at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland on
June 12. The 22 panelists again peered
into the future, with full awareness that
anyone's ability to do so is limited. But
if it accomplishes nothing else, the
economic outlook provides a useful
framework for discussing both the is-
sues surrounding economic growth,
particularly within the economists'
respective industries, and develop-
ments relating to monetary policy.
• The Outlook: Better than It Feels
The consensus forecast of the Round-
table shows the economy's first-quarter
expansion continuing at a similar rate
in the second quarter, with growth
evenly distributed between an upturn in
consumer spending and a restockpiling
of business inventories. The panel
projects real GDP growth to strengthen
to a 3 percent rate in the second half of
the year and to hold at that pace
through 1993 (figure 1). While the
Roundtable's projected 1992 expansion
is mild compared with past recovery
episodes, it is nevertheless expected to
be a solid, broad-based advance, except
for the government and commercial
real estate sectors.
Every economic forecast is different, of
course, employing alternative models
and various indicators, so there is al-
ways more than a little disagreement
within the panel. But the Roundtable is
nearly uniform in its assessment of
growth this year—23 percent of the
economists project 1992 real GDP
growth to be in the 1 Vi to 2 percent
range, and 77 percent expect a slightly
After receiving surprisingly upbeat
economic news for the first quarter,
participants of the latest Fourth Dis-
trict Economists' Roundtable uni-
formly agreed that the economy is
indeed on a higher growth path this
year than in 1991. The June meeting
generated varying opinions on busi-
ness investment conditions, business
cycle theory, and recent patterns of
money growth, some of which are
reproduced here. A central theme
expressed by the economists is that
we can expect steady and moderate
growth in the economy, at least over
the next year and a half.
ISSN 0428-1276higher 2 to 2 Vi percent increase. For
1993, the differences in view widen
somewhat: While half of the panel
projects real GDP growth between 3
and 3 Vi percent, the forecasts range
from 1 Vi to 3-V4 percent.
With respect to inflation, the Round-
table anticipates a 3.1 percent rise in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) this year—
significantly less than the 4.2 percent in-
crease in 1991. But much of the ex-
pected moderation in inflation is thought
to have already occurred. As the recov-
ery gains momentum, the panelists ex-
pect increases in the CPI to hover
around 3 Vi percent (figure 2). Again,
there is some disagreement on this
matter, with estimates ranging between
2 Vi and 3 Vi percent this year, and
widening to 2'/2 to 4'/4 percent in 1993.
Most economic forecasts are produced
using a bit of statistical analysis and a
lot of judgment. As recent experience
clearly demonstrates, however, even a
good dose of judgment may not allow
us to see very clearly into the future.
Sometimes, economists prefer to let his-
torical patterns in the data point the
way, without agonizing over the theory
that generates these movements. One
such model was presented at the latest
Roundtable meeting by Huntington
Bank economist James Coons.
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FIGURE 2 MEDIAN GDP IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATOR FORECAST
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NOTE: High and low are the average of the three highest and lowest forecasts, respectively.
SOURCE: Fourth District Economists' Roundtable, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, June 12, 1992.
Speculating about Economic
Growth in the Near Term:
An Atheoretical Approach
James Coons, Chief Economist,
Huntington National Bank
/ am going to take what I consider an
atheoretical approach to analyzing the
near-term prospects for the economy,
in that this view does not depend on
any particular theory of the business
cycle. All that is required is the assump-
tion that whatever drives the measures
of economic activity we observe, there
are some regular and reliable patterns.
With this in mind, I turn to indicators
of economic activity that, at least statis-
tically, have tended to lead changes in
business activity. In fact, these leading
properties can be exploited to produce
a specific forecast of economic growth
for the year. Based on the historical
relationship between real GDP growth
and the composite leading economic
index (LEI), the recent pattern of the
LEI is consistent with a 2
l/i percent in-
crease in real GDP this year. Given
the economy's first-quarter perform-
ance, this translates into an annual
growth rate of3
3A percent over the
next three quarters.
Unfortunately, a precise forecast is not
the same thing as an accurate one.
The LEI points to 3V4 percent as the
most likely rate of growth over the
balance of the year, but the index is
also consistent with other rates of ex-
pansion. As it turns out, the dispersion
of possible growth paths is wide enough
that we should not count too heavily on
any one of them.
But if the question is not what the
growth rate will be, but rather its likeli-
hood of exceeding a certain threshold,
this analysis does provide some guid-
ance. By specifically incorporating the
degree of uncertainty regarding the
LEI-GDP relationship and by examin-
ing the many different potential futures
that it implies, the odds that growth
will top its long-run trend rate of 3 per-
cent are approximately 2:1.A chief objection to the solid-growth
scenario is that M2 continues to ex-
pand too slowly to support a 4 percent
recovery. Recent research at the
Cleveland and Dallas Federal Reserve
Banks shows that the closing of failed
thrifts by the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (ETC) understates M2 by ac-
celerating the move out of small time
deposits at thrifts. This suggests that
slow M2 growth is a measurement
problem, not a policy problem. Finally,
other gauges of monetary thrust, such
as commodity prices, the foreign ex-
change value of the dollar, the slope of
the yield curve, and growth of the nar-
rower monetary aggregates, are consis-
tent with sufficient liquidity to sustain
economic growth of 4 percent.
• Interpreting the Data: What Does
This Picture Remind You of?
The nature of business cycles is one of
the most important—and unresolved—
issues in economics, and in the past 10
years the modeling of business cycle
behavior has undergone a welcome
reexamination. The substance of the
recent debate extends beyond the nar-
row bounds of what method best
predicts next quarter's real GDP in-
crease. It reconsiders the process that
underlies the irregular, and perhaps
even erratic, patterns we see in the in-
dicators of business activity. Is there a
unifying theory that explains business
cycles, and if so, can this theory be
identified by movements in economic
data? Or are these patterns the unpre-
dictable wandering of an economy in a
continual process of adjustment?
The Fourth District Roundtable invited
the comments of two economists with
different views on this subject. The
first, Professor Victor Zarnowitz of the
University of Chicago and a member of
the Business Cycle Dating Committee
of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), defended the con-
ventional interpretation of economic
data and, implicitly, the Roundtable's
expectation of a solid but moderate
expansion. In his remarks, Professor
Zarnowitz noted, "The NBER Business
Cycle Dating Committee, of which I
am a member, has not yet determined
when the recession that began around
July 1990 ended. I believe that it is still
too early to make this decision with the
required degree of confidence. Employ-
ment remains essentially flat and so is
real personal income, especially with-
out the prop of transfer payments. The
unemployment rate just jumped from
7.2 percent to 7.5 percent in April. But
output and sales have clearly been
recovering since the spring of 1991, and
speaking for myself only, the months
of March-May 1991 still look like
good candidates for the business cycle
trough at the present time."
Professor Zarnowitz further stated, "It
is important to recognize that business
cycles are influenced by real, monetary,
and expectational factors. The old con-
troversy about real versus monetary
theories has been instructive, but pro-
longing it is likely to produce more heat
than light. The mix of the forces varies
over time, and the really important
question is how they interact and why."
A provocative alternative to the conven-
tional view of business cycles, referred
to as real business cycle theory (RBC),
was offered by Professor John Boschen
of the College of William and Mary.
The RBC view suggests that many of
the movements in business statistics
are responses to a wide variety of large-
ly random events, such as droughts,
energy shortages, and changes in tech-
nology—events that affect our capacity
to produce goods and services. Conse-
quently, comparing recent patterns in
the data on business activity with pre-
vious recession/recovery episodes may
not be as revealing or useful as conven-
tional business cycle theory would lead
us to believe.
Professor Boschen presented interpreta-
tions suggesting that patterns in the eco-
nomic data being tracked from month
to month or from quarter to quarter are
much weaker than indicated by a nor-
mal business-cycle-oriented view. If
this is true, the inability to accurately
predict movements in the economy is
the result of experts being unable to
predict the many random events to
which the economy must adjust, as
well as of the chaotic nature of the ad-
justments themselves. Certainly this is
an issue we must weigh as we contem-
plate the Roundtable's June forecast of
the economy.
• The Outlook for
Business Fixed Investment
According to conventional business
cycle theory, spending on structures and
equipment has traditionally been a piv-
otal force at and around turning points
in business activity. With this in mind,
we asked economists James Meil of the
Eaton Corporation and Mark Coleman
of McGraw-Hill/F.W. Dodge Division
for their views on business investment
conditions. Their appraisals of this im-
portant sector were guardedly upbeat.
The Capital Spending Outlook
James P. Meil, Economist,
The Eaton Corporation
Looking at the prospects for capital
spending at midyear 1992,1 am gener-
ally encouraged by what 1 see for the
rest of this year and into 1993. To put it
simply, the sectors that have been weak
in the last few quarters should be sta-
bilizing or even turning around; sectors
that have been strong in the last two or
three quarters should continue to pro-
gress and even gain momentum.
High-tech information processing equip-
ment, particularly office and computing
machines, is benefiting from a confluence
of favorable technical and structural
trends. The drive for labor productivity
improvements, particularly in the service-
producing sectors, has helped to boost
budgets for this equipment.
Transportation equipment has behaved
erratically over the past few quarters,
but recent reports of stronger dealer
traffic have been encouraging. At
Eaton, we are pleased to note strength
in a transportation equipment marketTABLE 1 MONEY STOCK (M2) ASSUMPTIONS OF FOURTH DISTRICT




































SOURCE: Fourth District Economists
1 Roundtable, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, June 12, 1992.
important to us. Orders for class 8
trucks (semi-truck tractors) in the past
three months are at their highest levels
since the first quarter of 1989—their
peak for the last expansion. Based on
the industry's current plans, 135,000
heavy trucks will be built in North
America in 1992, a 25 percent increase
from 1991 's 107,000 level. The ques-
tion mark in transportation equipment
is aircraft production. Airlines, par-
ticularly U.S. domestics, have stretched
out their delivery schedules in light of
reduced passenger traffic.
Industrial equipment shipments have
been on a gradual, steady decline since
the first quarter of 1989. Traditionally,
an order turnaround for factory equip-
ment lags the onset of recovery by
about a year; if the typical pattern
holds, we should see new orders im-
proving now, leading to an increase in
shipments by late summer or fall.
While a slow recovery will work
against the momentum for an improve-
ment in industrial equipment ship-
ments, we do have the advantage of
starting this upturn at a higher rate of
capacity utilization than has ever been
the case.
The low level of corporate profitability
is occasionally cited as a factor that
can put a brake on capital spending
plans. I believe that the focus should be
on corporate cashflows and that the
current cashflow situation is quite
favorable for investment spending now
and in the foreseeable future.
The Commercial Construction
Outlook
Mark S. Coleman, Economist,
McGraw-Hill Information Systems
Co., F.W. Dodge Division
Given the precipitous contraction of
the commercial real estate market over
the past several years, few would dis-
pute that the unprecedented construc-
tion boom of the 1980s has left us with
a legacy of excess in the property mar-
kets. In short, since 1987, we have wit-
nessed an economic event not seen
since 1929: the wholesale collapse of
a major asset market. By virtually any
accounting, the magnitude of the finan-
cial bust in commercial real estate is
enormous. According to our calcula-
tions, the investment-grade property
market has lost, peak to trough, on the
order of $500 billion in value, or about
10 percent of current GDP.
Despite the current state of the market,
the news is not all bad—although this
interpretation certainly depends on
your perspective. Recent evidence sug-
gests that the rate of decline in commer-
cial construction has slowed, signaling
in our view that the wrenching contrac-
tion in new construction over the past
two years will soon reach bottom.
We expect a recovery to begin this year
in many sectors of the construction
market, although any substantial im-
provement is unlikely until 1993. This
recovery, however, will be charac-
terized by two features that distinguish
it from past expansions. First, the com-
position of new activity will be much
more heavily weighted toward residen-
tial and nonbuilding construction (such
as streets, highways, bridges, and
waste treatment), and away from com-
mercial construction. On the commer-
cial side, the ongoing glut of space,
combined with the apparent unwilling-
ness or inability of lenders to finance
new development, will deter any new
construction considerably. On the non-
building side, the recent passage of the
$120 billion lntermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act will en-
sure stronger-than-average growth in
infrastructure construction.
Second, the rebound in new construc-
tion will likely be far more restrained
than it traditionally has been during
this phase of a recovery. In particular,
the large jumps in new commercial con-
struction and planning that typically
help drive the early phase of an upturn
will not occur. This has both positive
and negative effects. Since commercial
real estate markets cannot absorb exist-
ing levels of space, much less any
sizable new increases, this shortfall of
new construction will help the strug-
gling commercial property market to
bounce back. Conversely, new commer-
cial activity is extremely stimulative.
With lower levels of new construction,
the recovery will be less robust than it
might otherwise be.
• Is M2 M.I.A.?
Among the important issues that in-
fluence the current economic outlook is
the growth of money—or in this in-
stance, perhaps, the lack of it. M2, the
Federal Reserve's most closely watched
monetary aggregate, has been growing
below its targeted rate this year. More-
over, there has recently been an appar-
ent breakdown in the relationships
between money (as measured by the
M2 aggregate), interest rates, and nomi-
nal spending. Meanwhile, the narrower
monetary aggregate, Ml, has been
growing briskly.
The majority of the Roundtable par-
ticipants estimate that M2 growth for
the year will be in the 2.5 to 4.0 per-
cent range, though most would prefer
to see a faster pace (table 1). Is M2's
present sluggishness an indication thatmonetary policy is a restraining influ-
ence on business activity, or is this ag-
gregate no longer an accurate barometer
of the thrust of monetary policy? We
asked two Roundtable economists,
Katherine Samolyk of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Mickey
Levy of CRT Government Securities,
to comment on the factors responsible
for the unusual behavior of M2.
The Case of the Missing Velocity
Katherine A. Samolyk, Economist,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
One explanation of the "missing
money" is that investors are shifting
their funds from depository institutions
into higher-yielding nonbank invest-
ments, such as bond funds. Viewing
intermediation by depositories in the
context of broader credit flows can
help to illustrate why the M2-nominal
spending relationship appears to have
broken down.
The decision to hold bank liabilities
versus claims on other financial firms
is related to their relative yields. These
yields, however, ultimately reflect the
relative returns on the assets being
funded by the respective intermediaries.
When the demand for the types of
credit funded by banks (and thrifts) is
low relative to the demand for nonbank
credit, banks have less incentive to
compete for investors' funds. Hence,
the volume of deposit liabilities
declines relative to the volume of non-
bank claims, and the growth ofM2 can
slow compared to that of broader
credit-market aggregates and nominal
spending.
Indeed, the ratio of assets held by
banks and thrifts to GDP has been
declining since 1988. Alternatively,
there has been a marked increase in as-
sets held by bond and equity funds as a
share of GDP. These trends, in part,
reflect sluggish loan demand in the cur-
rent economic environment as well as
the high differentials between long-
term yields and the shorter-term rates
paid on bank deposits. However, they
may also be indicative of a longer-term
decline in the importance of depository
institutions as conduits of debt finance.
From this perspective, the seeming
breakdown of the conventional M2
relationships may be due to a relatively
anomalous combination of factors that
suggest the missing money is merely
being invested elsewhere. Hence,
though the current situation merits
policy prudence, it is not clear that M2
should be abandoned as an inter-
mediate indicator of policy thrust.
The M2 Puzzle
Mickey D. Levy, Chief Economist,
CRT Government Securities
Virtually all of the slowdown in M2
growth has occurred as a consequence
of a sharp decline in small time
deposits, which fell $176 billion (15.2
percent) from April 1991 to April 1992.
Of that amount, $124 billion, or 70 per-
cent, was from thrift institutions. With
the exception of broker!dealer money
market funds, all other categories of
M2 not included in Ml have risen, in-
cluding savings deposits at thrifts.
There are three general explanations of
the wide gap between Ml and M2
growth. First, banks and their clients
have altered their portfolios in
response to the sharp steepening of the
yield curve, a change in opportunity
costs, and a decline in loan demand.
With bank loan demand shrinking,
banks are not bidding aggressively
for managed funds and are lowering
offered yields on CDs; with the Fed
pumping up reserves, banks are re-
allocating their asset portfolios into
U.S. Treasury securities and other
financial assets not counted in M2.
Second, RTC procedures for closing
failed thrifts have generated a decline
in small time deposits. By either paying
depositors at resolution or allowing the
new thrifts to which the deposits have
been transferred to reduce the yields
on CDs, RTC activities have created
reinvestment risk that has increased the
opportunity cost of CDs not captured
in standard money demand equations.
Third, there has been a movement of
small time deposits into stock and bond
funds, which in the past year have at-
tracted $135 billion in new assets.
Most of these assets flow back into M2;
however, to the extent that the proceeds
of stock and bond sales are used to
retire bank debt, M2 may be reduced.
Based on these alleged distortions, al-
ternative measures ofM2, excluding
small time deposits, are being con-
sidered and tested. As a cautionary
note, we must avoid experiments that
are not sound conceptually but merely
improve short-run empirical properties
so as to "preserve" monetarism. On
the other hand, 1 strongly believe M2
growth is understating the degree of
monetary thrust and that a temporary
(one-time) distortion ofM2 demand
must be considered in the conduct of
monetary policy.
The Roundtable discussion concerning
the wayward behavior of M2 was, at
times, lively. One interpretation of the
recent M2 path—and perhaps a warn-
ing to those ready to dismiss its eco-
nomic significance—was presented by
Paul Kasriel of The Northern Trust
Company.
Supply-Side Constraints on M2
Paul Kasriel, Vice President
and Economist,
The Northern Trust Company
Generally, as the Fed engineers a rate
decline, rates at which banks fund their
earning assets fall relative to the rates
that banks earn on these assets. Profit-
maximization motives, therefore, in-
duce banks to increase their earning
assets and, thus, their liabilities, which
account for the bulk of the more broad-
ly defined monetary aggregates. Fall-
ing short-term interest rates, therefore,
would be expected to have both a
demand-side effect and a supply-side
effect on transaction balances....
We believe that the normal positive
supply-side effect on bank liability
growth emanating from falling short-
term interest rates is being over-
whelmed by the contractionary effectson liability growth stemming from
depository institution closure activities
of the RTCIFDIC and from real or
perceived leverage capital constraints
on the banking system's expansion of
earning assets. We view these negative
supply-side effects as having the same
contractionary implications for econo-
mic activity as a deliberate Fed policy-
induced slowing ofM2 growth. By not
pushing down short-term interest rates
even more, the Fed may be inadvertent-
ly pursuing a more restrictive monetary
policy than it realizes.
• Conclusion
The Roundtable economists concurred
that the economy is on the upswing and
that output will continue to grow mod-
erately, at least over the next 1 V2 years.
In any event, we suspect that the V2 per-
centage point reduction in the discount
rate on July 2 was welcome news to
the Roundtable group. This action may
prove to be the spur that ultimately
provides the added M2 growth most of
the panelists recommend. No doubt this
will be an issue when the Roundtable
next convenes on October 2.
• Footnotes
1. The first-quarter growth rate has since
been revised upward to 2.7 percent (with
consumer spending up $40.2 billion and an
inventory liquidation of $16.6 billion).
2. The LEI is a combination of economic
indicators that tend to move in advance of
overall business activity. The index is com-
piled each month by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Michael F. Bryan is an economic advisor and
John J. Erceg is an assistant vice president
and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland. The authors thank Lydia
Leovicfor preparing and compiling the
Roundtable forecast.
The views stated herein are reported by
the authors and are not necessarily those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of
the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
But is monetary policy supportive of
an expanding economy? Some par-
ticipants raised doubts about this issue
in light of the below-par performance
of M2 so far this year, arguing that the
Federal Reserve should be more aggres-
sive in restoring M2 growth to its tar-
geted range. Others on the panel ques-
tioned whether M2 is the appropriate
policy guide.
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